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THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS
JACK M. BEERMANN* & WILLIAM P. MARSHALL

This Article investigates whether there are constitutionalprinciples
that guide the conduct of the President of the United States during
presidentialtransitionsand, if so, how far those obligations extend.
We introduce the issue by reviewing the procedures for selecting
and inaugurating the President and by canvassing the historical
record as to how transitions have previously been accomplished.
We then discuss whether constitutionalprovisions such as the Take
Care Clause, the Oath Clause, and the Term Clauses and/or the
President'sforeign policy and national security powers confer legal
duties on the President with respect to transition. We conclude that
presidentialtransitionsimpose some constitutionalobligations upon
the President, but that outside the area of foreign policy, the extent
of those obligations is relatively limited. We suggest that the
outgoing President must offer sufficient briefings and assistance to
assure that the new President is able and prepared to execute her
powers from the first day in office. We contend, however, that the
outgoing President is under no obligation to implement the new
President'spolitical agenda or to end implementing his own even if
the new Presidentmay be forced by the outgoing President'sactions
to expend her political capital to undo the previous administration's
work. The Constitution does not demand that the outgoing
Presidentpave the political way for his successor.
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INTRODUCTION

Presidential transition periods are times of uncertainty and
contradiction. The outgoing President retains all the formal legal
powers of the presidency, yet his last electoral success is four years
removed and his political capital is at low ebb.1 The incoming
President, in contrast, enjoys an electoral mandate and enormous
political influence but has no formal control over the reins of
government.2 During transitions, in short, there is no relationship
between power, accountability, and electoral support that normally
hallmarks the democratic process.3
Presumably, of course, not all is askew. Both Presidents, having
achieved the highest level of public service, should be expected to act
in the best long-term interests of the United States. And both may be
motivated by the image of two prominent leaders burying their
differences and acting together in the common good. But beyond this
level of generality, the transition agendas of the two Presidents are
unlikely to be aligned. For example, even if both Presidents are from
the same political party, their goals in the transition period may be
widely disparate. The outgoing President will be concerned with

1. LAURIN L. HENRY, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS 3 (1960).
Indeed, if the
incumbent has been defeated in the election, his power is not only at low ebb, but his
agenda has been effectively repudiated.
2. Meanwhile, members of the outgoing administration tend to view their successors
as na've upstarts, while their successors view their predecessors as trapped in failed
policies. CARL M. BRAUER, PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS: EISENHOWER THROUGH
REAGAN 15 (1986).
3. Indeed, in circumstances where the transition occurs after the incumbent has been
defeated, the relationship between power and democratic support is fully reversed. See
Sanford Levinson, Presidential Elections and Constitutional Stupidities, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 183, 184-85 (1995).
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preserving his legacy.' The incoming President, on the other hand,
will be focused on beginning her own initiatives and on establishing a
record in the first one hundred days that can set the stage for success
throughout the next four years.' The dominant agenda for the
outgoing President, in short, is shoring up the past; the agenda for the
incoming President is embarking on the future.
When the two Presidents are from opposing parties, the conflicts
during the transition period will be even more acute. The outgoing
President will want to protect his policies or accomplishments from
being reversed or undermined, and he may also affirmatively want to
create obstacles to prevent his successor from too quickly achieving
political and policy success. The incoming President, in turn, may
desire to expeditiously reverse the policies of the previous President
and may additionally choose to tarnish the record of her predecessor
in order to weaken any remaining support for his programs.
Throughout history, presidential transitions have followed no
consistent pattern. Some Presidents have worked closely with their
predecessors or successors.6

Some have been markedly less

cooperative-for partisan reasons or otherwise.7
Because no
constitutional provision specifically addresses this type of conduct
during the transition period, presidential transitions have proceeded
ad hoc rather than guided by explicit legal or constitutional principles.
The question then arises as to whether there are constitutional
constraints that govern Presidents with respect to transition, or
whether presidential action in this area is wholly discretionary. Does
the outgoing President have a duty to facilitate the transition to a new
administration (and, if so, how far does this obligation extend)? Or
should the outgoing President continue to exercise power until his last
day in office as if there had been no election-that is, in undivided
pursuit of his own agenda? Similarly, does the incoming President
have residual duties after transition to the old administration once she
takes office, or is she free to wholly ignore the actions of the old

4. BRAUER, supra note 2, at 97-98.

5. The first hundred days represents a special opportunity for the President and his
new team to seize momentum; during this time, they "have an almost unparalleled
opportunity to achieve early program results." This time represents an interval when the
President's critics are not likely to publicly criticize him, while his allies organize around
him with their support. MARTHA JOYNT KUMAR, THE WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECr,
OPPORTUNITIES AND HAZARDS 4 (1998), available at http://whitehouse2001.org/WHTP

ConsultancyReport.PDF.
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See infra Part I.B.
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administration? 8
This Article concludes that constitutional principles do indeed
guide the conduct of the President and, to a lesser extent, the
President-elect during presidential transitions. In our view, the
constitutional duties that govern presidential conduct, while narrow,
impose substantial and significant obligations on Presidents during
the transition between administrations. We rely primarily on the
Term, Take Care, and Oath Clauses of the Constitution, and on the
President's broad foreign affairs and protective powers. We therefore
reject the position that the "rules" governing presidential transitions
are only matters of comity without legal force. Any legal principles to
be derived, however, will necessarily be quite general given the fact
that the President is vested with substantial discretion with respect to
how his obligations are to be fulfilled. Some general principles,
however, may be discerned.
The Term Clauses9 require that the outgoing President should
not act in any manner that threatens peaceful presidential transition
and must take all possible steps to assure an orderly transition. The
Take Care Clause ° requires that the outgoing President help ensure
that the new administration is able to execute its powers from its first
day in office. The Oath Clause" and the President's protective
powers require that the outgoing President do all that she can to
prepare the new President to meet threats to national security.
Finally, the President's foreign affairs powers require that the
outgoing and incoming Presidents act in a manner that advances the
ability of the United States to conduct foreign affairs.12
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides the necessary
background. It reviews the procedures for selecting and inaugurating
the President and introduces the types of issues that arise concerning
presidential transition. Part II discusses the legal issues. It first
examines whether the Constitution imposes legal duties on the
President with respect to transition. Concluding that it does, this Part
then attempts to discern the nature of those obligations. Part III
discusses the particular problems raised by presidential transitions
and the actions of federal agencies.
8. In this Article, we refer to any obligations the incoming President has to the
outgoing administration as transition obligations, although, as a technical matter, the
transition is over once the new President takes office.

9.
10.
11.
12.

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
See infra Part II.B.
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I. LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A.

ConstitutionalTransition
The Constitution says little about presidential transitions.
Article II sets the term of office at four years. 3 Article I111 and the
Twelfth Amendment 5 set forth how Presidents are to be elected.
The Twentieth Amendment 16 specifies January 20 as the date for
inauguration of the victor, at which time an incumbent who has not
been reelected leaves office. The Twenty-Second Amendment
provides that no President may be elected for more than two terms. 7
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides for presidential succession in
circumstances when the President leaves office, by death or
otherwise, prior to the expiration of his term. 8 No provision,
however, discusses how the transfer of power is to be achieved.
Nonetheless, presidential transition periods are obviously
anticipated by the constitutional structure. The constitutional system
for electing and installing the President ensures that the President will
serve for a substantial period of time either knowing or facing a
strong possibility that his period in office as President will be ending
at a specific time in the near future. 9

Presidential elections are

conducted every four years regardless of circumstance. There is no
provision in the U.S. Constitution for early elections and none for
elections to be delayed. The legislature or some other body such as
the cabinet cannot force early elections to replace an unpopular
President. Even if the presidency is vacated during a term due to
resignation, death, or impeachment and conviction, or if the President
becomes unable to serve for health or other reasons, the election
schedule remains unchanged. At the point the presidency is vacated,
another designated officer, usually the Vice President, serves out the
remainder of the former President's term or, in the case of an
incapacitated President, until the President is able to resume his

13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
14. U.S. CONST. art. II.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
19. Although the formal transition period exists only from the election to the
inauguration of the new President, similar issues regarding the proper use of power arise
in circumstances when the President knows he is leaving office even before the actual
election, as in the case of the President nearing the end of the second term or an
incumbent believing he is likely to be defeated.
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duties. °
That there will be regular periods of presidential transition is also
assured by the fact that the President may be elected only twice and
may serve, under normal circumstances, a maximum of ten years.2 '
Further, the President is chosen via a three-step process that, under
current procedures, 2 2 takes two full months to complete, and the
chosen President is not inaugurated until two weeks after that process
is completed, about two and one-half months after the election. 3
The mechanics of the transition have evolved over time,
including significant changes to its statutorily- and constitutionallymandated structure. The Constitution provides that the President
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV. Even if a President-elect's temporary or permanent
inability to serve, due for example to death, ineligibility, lack of qualifications, or a
disputed election, arises before inauguration day, the Vice President-elect serves either
the full term (in the case of the death of the President-elect) or temporarily, for example
due to temporary disability of the President-elect. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3. If neither
the President-elect nor the Vice President-elect is "qualified" by inauguration day, for
example due to a disputed election, Congress has the power to designate an acting
President or specify a procedure for choosing an acting President. Id. There is no
provision for changing the election schedule even in extraordinary circumstances.
21. The President may be elected only once if she has served more than two years of a
term for which someone else was elected. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXII ("No person
shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held
the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which
some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President
more than once."). It is possible that someone could serve more than ten years as
President if a President who has already been elected the maximum number of times
became President again by being elected Vice President or being appointed as Vice
President and then succeeding the President. Needless to say, however, such a scenario is
unlikely. See Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice and Future President:
ConstitutionalIntersticesand the Twenty-Second Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 565, 56569 (1999).
22. The requirement that presidential elections be held on the first Tuesday after the
first Monday in November is statutory. See 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("The electors of President
and Vice President shall be appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday next after the first
Monday in November, in every fourth year succeeding every election of a President and
Vice President."). Presumably, then, the transition period could be shortened, as Sanford
Levinson notes, to a much briefer time period if Congress chose instead to set a January
election date. See Levinson, supra note 3, at 184.
23. The three steps in the electoral process are as follows: First, on the first Tuesday
after the first Monday in November of an election year, the voters cast their votes,
choosing the electors who will actually elect the President. See 3 U.S.C. § 1. Second, on
the first Monday after the second Wednesday in December, the electors meet in each state
and vote for President and Vice President, id. § 7, and transmit their votes to Washington,
D.C. Id. § 10. Third, at 1:00 pm on January 6 of the year following the election, the
electoral votes are counted in a joint session of Congress which is presided over by the
President of the Senate, also known as the incumbent Vice President of the United States.
Id. § 15. Two weeks later, on January 20, the newly-elected President and Vice President
are inaugurated for a four-year term in office. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1. Of course,
the presidential election process is preceded by a lengthy primary election process.
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serves a four-year term.24 Because the government under the
Constitution began operating on March 4, 1789,25 March 4 was
established as the date for inaugurating the new President and
convening a new Congress every two years.26 The Constitution does
not specify an election date. This is done by Congress, and in 1792,
Congress specified that the election should be held sometime in late
October, November, or early December. 7
In 1845, Congress
mandated the nationally uniform date of the first Tuesday after the
first Monday in November.2 8 When a new President was elected, this
meant that an outgoing President would remain in office for four
months after the successor had been chosen. During this four-month
period, the President would be a lame duck, but would still have a
great deal of government business to handle as President. The length
of this period caused significant problems when the outgoing
President lacked sufficient power to deal with a crisis or when the
outgoing President took actions that were against the will of the
electorate as expressed in the November election.2 9 These problems,
together with improvements in travel and communications that
reduced the time necessary for a new President and Congress to
24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.

25. James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanation" Account of the
Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1293-94 (1998) (citing 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

1786-1870, at 161 (Washington, Department of State 1894)).
26. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (establishing two years as the term for members of
the House of Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (establishing six years as the
term for members of the Senate); see also David P. Currie, The Constitutionin Congress:
Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 839 n.386
(1994) (discussing the confusion in early Congresses over the beginnings and endings of
legislators' terms).
27. See Presidential Succession Act of 1792, 1 Stat. 240 (1792) (repealed 1845) (stating
that electors must be chosen "within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in
December").
28. See Act of Jan. 23, 1845, 5 Stat. 721, ch. 1 (current version at 3 U.S.C. § 1).
29. President Woodrow Wilson, expecting to lose the 1916 election, lamented the role
that he, as a lame duck, would play in foreign affairs:
Four months would lapse before [the President-elect] could take charge of the
affairs of the government, and during those four months I would be without such
moral backing from the nation as would be necessary to steady and control our
relations with other governments. I would be known to be the rejected, not the
accredited, spokesman of the country; and yet the accredited spokesman would be
without legal authority to speak for the nation. The direction of the foreign policy
of the government would in effect have been taken out of my hands and yet its
new definition would be impossible until [the inauguration].
Nancy Amoury Combs, Carter, Reagan, and Khomeni: Presidential Transitions and
InternationalLaw, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 303, 329-30 n.109 (2001).
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prepare to take office, led to constitutional reforms under which the
new President is inaugurated on January 20 and the new Congress

begins two and one-half weeks earlier, on January 3.30
In addition to adjusting the timing of inaugurations, a second
major constitutional change affecting presidential transition was the
ratification in 1951 of the Twenty-Second Amendment imposing the
two-term limit on presidential service.31 The length of the President's
term, including whether there should be term limits, was hotly
debated during the Constitutional Convention, with the ultimate
decision being a four-year term with no limit on the number of times
a President could be reelected.3 2 The issue of term limits was
originally tied by the Framers to the issue of presidential selection.33

If the power to select the President were given to Congress, then the
consensus was that a term limit would be necessary to prevent
congressional domination of the government.
Congress would
dominate under such a structure because the President would cater to

Congress's wishes in order to continue in office.

If, on the other

hand, the power to select the President were in some other body, such
as the states or the people, then no term limit would be necessary
because reelection would not threaten the separation of powers. The

Framers thought that reelection would ensure that the President
would act in the public interest, and they did not perceive any reason
to prevent the people from reelecting a successful, popular President.

The issue of presidential term limits arose periodically in
Congress, beginning in 1803 with the rejection by Congress of a
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XX. A constitutional amendment was necessary to make
these changes because they affected the length of the terms of the then-incumbent
President and members of Congress, and the length of those terms were constitutionally
prescribed. See supra notes 24 and 26.
31. As noted, the amendment technically is a limit on the number of times an
individual may be elected President, not a limit on the length of time an individual may
serve as President. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. However, the electability
limit has functioned as if it were a limit on service and it makes sense to treat it as such for
the purposes of our analysis.
32. Although the Framers resolved the issue in favor of unlimited presidential service,
a tradition limiting Presidents to two terms in office arose early. According to the
folklore, Washington believed in a two-term limit to prevent anyone from becoming
"President for life" akin to a king. In a draft of his farewell address, Washington
mentioned this belief. See GEORGE WASHINGTON, GEORGE WASHINGTON: WRITINGS
941-42 (John Rhodehamel ed., 1997). In the actual address as delivered and published,
however, Washington mentioned only personal reasons for stepping aside. See id. at 96277. Based on Washington's example, and the views of Thomas Jefferson and Jefferson's
immediate successors, an informal limit of two terms was observed by every President
until 1940 when Franklin Roosevelt ran for and was elected to a third term. See Peabody
& Gant, supra note 21, at 578-79 (discussing Jefferson's views on presidential term limits).
33. Peabody & Gant, supra note 21, at 589-90.
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proposal to limit Presidents to three terms, only two of which could

be successive.34 Fears of an entrenched President inspired periodic
calls for term limits, with rumblings over the issue arising most
strongly when a strong second-term President raised concerns that
the President might seek a third term. After Franklin Roosevelt won
reelection for a third time (and a fourth term) in 1944, the movement
picked up steam, and after his death in 1945, a 1947 congressional
coalition between Republicans and Southern Democrats passed the
proposed amendment by a sufficient margin to send it to the states for
ratification.35 Southern Democrat and Republican-dominated state
legislatures ratified the Twenty-Second Amendment in short order,
and by 1951 the Amendment had been ratified by the required twothirds of the states.36
In any event, the passage of the Twenty-Second Amendment
assures that presidential transitions will occur regularly. There will be
a new President at least every eight years, except in the rare instance
in which a President dies in office or resigns in the second half of a
term and is replaced by the Vice President, who is then elected twice.
In such a case, a presidential transition will occur after eight to ten
years. In actuality, new Presidents are inaugurated more often than
every eight years on average,37 and often the new President is of a
different political party than the President he replaces.3" Presidential
transitions, thus, are an important, common, and inevitable element
34. Id. at 590.
35. Id. at 598.
36. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXII; Peabody & Gant, supra note 21, at 599. It is
understandable that members of Congress would support a term limit on the President
because the limit would tend to weaken the President and thus tend to increase the power
of Congress. The fact that Republicans generally favored term limits more than
Democrats may have been merely the historical accident that the first President to have
violated the tradition was a Democrat whose liberal economic and civil rights policies
apparently provoked opposition from the Republicans and Southern Democrats who
supported the term limit. See Peabody & Gant, supra note 21, at 585 n.102. This may
have been shortsighted on the part of Republicans since the next three Presidents to be
elected to second terms were Republicans, although only two of the three, Dwight
Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan, served two complete terms. Richard M. Nixon resigned
during his second term.
37. Since 1948, Presidents have served an average of five and one quarter years.
During this period, five Presidents were elected for only one term and five for two terms.
President Kennedy, of course, did not complete his first term, and President Nixon did not
complete his second term.
38. Since 1948, there have been eight presidential transitions that have occurred
through the normal electoral process. Seven of those involved a change in political party,
the only exception being Reagan to Bush I. The successions of Presidents Johnson and
Ford, of course, were intraparty because they occurred through assassination and
resignation, respectively.
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of the constitutional and governmental structure of the United States.
B.

PresidentialTransitionin Practice

The

lack

of

explicit

constitutional

provisions

regarding

presidential transition has left it to Presidents and their successors to

develop practices to facilitate orderly and effective transition. This
process has evolved over time. Over the years, as society and
government have become more complex, planning for presidential
transition has become more involved, and now begins significantly
before the election.39 Outgoing administrations have also increasingly
aided in the handover of power by providing reports on their
activities and other assistance during the transition.4'
Transition between presidencies involves more than handing
over the keys to the White House and taking an oath of office.

Significant preparation is required along a number of fronts. First,
preparations must be made to make all of the appointments within
government that change with the administration. The most important
appointments involve the cabinet, the President's chief of staff, and
other high level close advisors, but there are also numerous lower
level appointments made at the time of transition.4 1 This work

includes identifying nominees, checking their backgrounds, and doing
the necessary legwork to secure Senate confirmation when required.
Second, incoming officials must prepare themselves to take office by
receiving information and policy briefings. Third, the President-elect
must be prepared for office with briefings on the issues likely to
require presidential attention. Finally, on what may be viewed as a
fourth front, the President and his advisors must devise a political

strategy to bring the goals on which they campaigned to fruition.42
39. Most presidential campaigns, for example, have persons in the organization whose
responsibility is focused solely on transition issues. After the election, the President-elect
is entitled to government support for the planning process, including office space and
government funds. Presidential Transition Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-277, § 3, 78 Stat.
153, 154 (1964). Under the 2000 amendments to the Act, the new administration also
receives assistance in processing the background checks of political appointees.
Presidential Transition Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-293 sec. 2, § 3(a), 114 Stat. 1035,
1035-36 (2000) (codified at 3 U.S.C. § 102 (2000)).
40. See HENRY, supra note 1, at 707. See generally BRAUER, supra note 2 (providing
a history of presidential transitions).
41. A list of all the presidentially appointed positions in the United States government
is provided in the "Plum book." H. COMM. ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, 108TH CONG.,
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY AND SUPPORTING POSITIONS 213-15 (Comm.
Print 2004) [hereinafter PLUM BOOK], available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/plumbook/
2004/index.html. The Plum book lists 1,457 presidential appointments, but does not
specify how many are made at the point of transition. See id. at 215.
42. MARTHA JOYNT KUMAR ET AL., THE WHITE HOUSE 2001 PROJECT, MEETING
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The President-elect needs the cooperation of the incumbent

President and the outgoing administration on at least the second and
third fronts. Historically, outgoing officials have held meetings with
their successors and some have remained in office for a time after the
new President was inaugurated

to help with the transition.4 3

Presidential candidates have received national security briefings to
prepare them in case they are elected."

Outgoing Presidents have

met with or offered to meet with their successors, and, in a symbol of
continuity, have taken part in the inauguration ceremony.45
The nature and degree of help provided by the outgoing
administration to the new administration has varied over the nation's
history and not all outgoing Presidents have been helpful in assisting
with transition. President Calvin Coolidge, for example, was reported
to be extremely uncooperative in working with his successor, fellow
Republican Herbert Hoover. Referring to any purported obligation
on his part to help Hoover address the nation's problems before
leaving office, Coolidge reportedly stated: "We'll leave that for the
Wonder Boy."46 Moreover, even when cooperation by the outgoing

administration has been offered, such "aid" has often been designed
more as an attempt by outgoing officials to retain influence in the new
administration rather than as an effort to help the incoming
administration accomplish its objectives. 7
Nevertheless, there is some pattern, dating back at least to the

1913 Taft-Wilson transition, of outgoing administrations recognizing
PLANNING FOR THE TRANSITION TO POWER 3-12
(2000), available at http://whitehouse2001.orglWHTPFreightTrain.PDF (reporting, based
on interviews with sixty-nine White House staff members, the details of the steps required
for a smooth presidential transition).
43. The Wilson-Harding and Hoover-Roosevelt transitions serve as examples. See
BRAUER, supra note 2, at 14 ("[Oiffice-leavers invariably want to feel that they have done
their best to prepare their successors for their new responsibilities ....
");HENRY, supra
note 1, at 62-63, 285-310.
44. President Harry Truman initiated the tradition of briefing both candidates on
matters of foreign affairs during the campaign, although it appears his favoritism toward
the candidate of his own party limited the success of the endeavor. See HENRY, supra
note 1, at 473.
45. For example, even after the topsy-turvy 2000 election, outgoing President Bill
Clinton attended the inauguration of his successor, George W. Bush. See Glenda Holste,
Editorial, Small Circles of Power Reduce Influence of Big Money, Restore Integrity, ST.
PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan. 21, 2001, at 17A, available at Westlaw, General News Library.
On the other hand, President John Adams was criticized for sneaking out of Washington
early in the morning of the inauguration of his successor Thomas Jefferson. See DAVID
MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 564-66 (2001).
46. See PAUL JOHNSON, MODERN TIMES: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD FROM THE
1920's TO THE YEAR 2000, at 229 (2000).
47. See HENRY, supra note 1, at 62.
THE FREIGHT TRAIN HEAD ON:
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the need to facilitate smooth transitions in order to further the
national interest." This pattern of increased efforts by outgoing
administrations to foster smooth transitions began particularly to take
hold with the Truman-Eisenhower transition. That transition was the
first to occur under the abbreviated transition schedule imposed by
the Twentieth Amendment, which moved inauguration day from
March 4 to January 20. Perhaps because he was sensitive to the time
pressures involved, President Truman was deliberate in his attempts
to set precedents for future transitions. Accordingly, he directed a
transition that combined all the elements that exist in current
presidential transition practice-personal meetings between the
President and President-elect, offers and actual assistance on
complicated pressing matters, detailed briefings and memoranda
across the board, and holdover of sub-cabinet officials to help
successors get a firm grasp on the machinery of government. 49 From
the Truman-Eisenhower transition onward, the contacts between the
incoming and outgoing administrations would be more regularized."
As the complexity of the government has increased, presidential
transitions have become more and more difficult to manage.
Historically, campaign funds and private donations were used to
cover transition-related expenses such as office space, clerical help,
and travel expenses. Congress relieved the parties of that burden
with the Presidential Transition Act of 1963 (the "Act"). 5' Under the
Act, Congress provides funds for the President-elect to establish a
transition team and to bring potential appointees to Washington for
interviews and general vetting. Funding under the Act has increased
from approximately $375,000 for Richard M. Nixon in 1968-6952 to
$5.27 million for George W. Bush in 2000-01.13 This funding allows
the President-elect to make substantial preparations before taking
48. For example, Wilson's incoming Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, was
provided with elaborate memoranda on important matters to his department by his
predecessor. See id. at 74.
49. See id. at 478-80. Truman's interest in a smooth transition was not necessarily
reciprocated by his successor. According to one historian, while President Eisenhower's
transition team was very interested in redecorating the White House offices and making
sure there was furniture and space for new staff, the team apparently was not interested in
the "operating procedures and substantive business of the White House ... [and]
uninterested in discussions with their predecessors." See id. at 510-11.
50. See id. at 692-97.
51. Pub. L. No. 88-277, 78 Stat. 153, 153-56 (1964).
52. BRAUER, supra note 2, at 131.
53. Press Release, U.S. General Services Administration, Presidential Transition Fact
Sheet (Nov. 17, 2000), available at http://www.gsa.gov/Portal/gsa/ep/contentView.do?
contentld=9025&contentType=GSABASIC.
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office, largely in terms of identifying and attracting potential
appointees. In addition, the Act was amended in 20004 in order to
streamline the appointments process during transition. 5
The period of time between the election and the inauguration,
now six weeks shorter than originally provided for, is still long enough
to create problems for the transition. Although the President remains
in office until his successor is inaugurated, the President's political
power is vastly diminished, especially if the incumbent has lost an
election. An outgoing President may lack the political power to take
strong action even if all would agree that such action would be in the
national interest. In some such situations an outgoing President may
seek commitments or assurances of continuity from his successor so
he can effectively pursue a policy in the waning days of his
administration.56 For a variety of reasons, an incoming President may
be reluctant to make commitments before coming into office. For
one, making an agreement with an outgoing President may make the
incoming President appear weak just at the moment that the new
President's power should be at its zenith.57 Additionally, an
agreement may strengthen the outgoing President or the outgoing
President's party in anticipation of the next congressional or
presidential election. Also, the incoming President may be afraid that
he will regret a commitment made without the full information and
opportunities for consultation available only upon taking office.58
Thus, even in a crisis in which immediate and decisive presidential
action would be in the national interest, it is unlikely that an incoming
President would make an agreement on a course of action with the
outgoing President.
The certainty of the deadline and the lengthy period between the

54. Presidential Transition Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-293, 114 Stat. 1035 (codified
at 3 U.S.C. § 102 (2000)).
55. Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal Appointments
Process,50 DUKE L.J. 1687, 1699 (2001).
56. See infra note 90 (discussing incoming President Franklin Roosevelt's failure to
assist outgoing President Herbert Hoover resolve a banking crisis).
57. The phenomenon of incoming Presidents not wanting to make commitments dates
back to the first time that an incumbent lost a reelection bid. Thomas Jefferson was
unwilling to make commitments on pressing issues even when it might have helped ensure
that he would be elected by the House of Representatives after the election failed to
produce a winner. See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 45, at 561-62. Other examples are
Woodrow Wilson's refusal to make any commitments regarding a crisis in Mexico and
Franklin Roosevelt's refusal to make any commitments regarding the economy, despite
Hoover's repeated efforts. See HENRY, supra note 1, at 292-302.
58. See HENRY, supra note 1, at 292-302 (discussing Roosevelt's reluctance to assist
Hoover in the transition).
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election and the inauguration of the new President provide conditions
for a great deal of late-term activity by an outgoing administration.59
Late-term actions by the outgoing administration can be beneficial
for a new administration if the actions ease the transition or take care
of a messy problem before a new administration takes office. There
are stories, recounted in Laurin Henry's study of the transitions of the
early twentieth century, of Presidents and Presidents-Elect conferring
on inauguration morning while the incumbent President finished up
last-minute business, including signing and vetoing legislation.'
At other times, however, last minute actions by the outgoing
administration can raise serious problems for a new administration.
One classic example of this is President Adams's last minute
appointment of judges before the beginning of the Jefferson
presidency. 61 More recently, outgoing administrations have engaged
in significant regulatory action late in the term.62 Some late-term
actions are simply the result of the human tendency to work to
deadline, while others may be designed, at least in part, to create
political obstacles for the incoming administration. In recent decades,
in particular, there has been a pattern to presidential transition when
the incoming President is of a different political party from the
outgoing President. The output of the outgoing administration,
including presidential and agency action of various types, tends to
59. If regulatory activity is measured by Federal Register pages as a rough proxy, then
such activity has surged in the last quarter of the presidential term in every presidency
since at least 1948. According to a recent survey, the turnover of a whole administration
is, on average, associated with a twenty-eight percent jump in this measure of regulatory
activity during the post-election period. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing:
Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New PresidentArrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV.
557, 563 (2003); Jay Cochran, III, The Cinderella Constraint: Why Regulations Increase
Significantly During Post-Election Quarters 3 (Mar. 8, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the North Carolina Law Review), available at http://www.mercatus.org/pdf/
materials/459.pdf.
60. See HENRY, supra note 1, at 70-72, 197-98, 355. This occurrence was more likely
before the transition between Congresses and the inauguration were moved to January.
Under prior practice, a lame-duck session of Congress began in December of the election
year after a new Congress had already been elected. That Congress would send bills,
often including a budget, to the lame-duck President right up to inauguration day. The
outgoing President would be signing and vetoing bills on inauguration day with his
successor in the room. Under current practice it is unlikely, but not impossible, for the
new Congress, installed on January 3, to have already sent any bills to the President by the
inauguration day of January 20.
61. See Charles F. Hobson, John Marshall, the Mandamus Case, and the Judiciary
Crisis,1801-1803, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289, 291 (2003).
62. For a description of the types of midnight regulations that tend to be taken late in
an administration's term and the motives for those actions, see Jack M. Beermann,
PresidentialPower in Transitions,83 B.U. L. REV. 947, 953-82 (2003).
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increase substantially, especially when the outgoing administration is
of the Democratic Party and the incoming President is a Republican.63

In response, incoming Presidents have found it necessary to react by
reexamining the late-term regulatory output of the prior
administration, sometimes during a freeze issued by the new
administration on the implementation of rules issued at the very end
of the prior President's term. 6'
The historical record, in short, is mixed. At times, outgoing
administrations are particularly helpful in facilitating transition. 65 At
times, they place obstacles in front of their successors. At times, they
may be helpful in some aspects of transition and obstructionist in
others.
C.

The IncreasingStakes and Internal Conflicts in Presidential
Transition

The lack of a consistent pattern in presidential transitions should
not be surprising. As noted previously, both incoming and outgoing
Presidents face competing pressures during the transition period. On
the one hand, there is the motivation to cooperate as fully as possible

with the other administration. On the other, there are the demands
not to sacrifice one's own political agenda and/or unduly promote a
competing political program. These differing approaches may be
termed, at the risk of oversimplification, the "good government" and
the "good politics" models of presidential transition. What is

63. The increase in administrative output and other aspects of presidential transitions
are described in detail by Beermann, id. at 953-60. See also Cochran, supra note 59, at 3
n.6 (describing increase in regulatory output when Democrats Carter and Clinton were
replaced by Republicans Reagan and Bush, respectively). Although Cochran reports
increases at the end of every term, the biggest increases occurred in the Carter-Reagan
and Clinton-Bush transitions, both involving outgoing Democrats and incoming
Republicans. See id.
64. In response to the last-minute rulemaking of the Clinton administration, President
George W. Bush ordered his Chief of Staff to issue a "memorandum directing agencies to
delay the effective dates of recently published rules, not to issue any new regulations, and
to withdraw finalized but not yet published regulations from the Federal Register."
Beermann, supra note 62, at 949.
65. Another relatively minor aspect of the transition is that outgoing Presidents and
their spouses, which until now have always been "first ladies," have traditionally helped
the incoming President with the household aspects of becoming President. Incoming first
ladies have been invited into the White House to survey the premises and meet the
household staff. Outgoing Presidents have made room for the incoming first family's
belongings to be moved into the White House in advance of the inauguration. Some of
these household arrangements are related to the performance of the President, as the
White House is the site of numerous official functions, and the transition can be helped by
a smooth handover of the household details of the presidency.
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interesting is that the urgencies underlying both of these competing
forces have dramatically increased in recent decades.
For a number of reasons, there is now a greater need than any
time in our nation's history for incoming and outgoing
administrations to work cooperatively during transition periods. To
begin with, government is more complex and an incoming
administration faces an inestimable learning curve in assuming office
and digesting the mounds of information necessary to be able to
understand the powers at its disposal and govern effectively.
Accordingly, a new administration cannot learn all it needs to know
in its first day of office.66 The new administration must engage in
substantial preparation before assuming office and in so doing will be
highly dependant on the old administration to prioritize the
information to be learned and to direct members of the new
administration to appropriate sources.67
Second, as societal problems also become more complex there is
a corresponding need for the governing administration to have access
to the material, ideas, and data to address important issues. Again, in
order to effectively govern, the new administration must have access
to such materials before its first days in office.
Third, national security and foreign policy concerns demand
enhanced cooperation and communication between the two
administrations. As the world becomes more dangerous and the risks
of harm more immediate, the need for effective and seamless
transitions becomes correspondingly greater.6 Terrorists and nations
engaged in conflict with the United States could exploit a flawed
transition period when an adequate response to hostile action may be
less likely.69 Thus, in this area particularly, the need for outgoing and
incoming Presidents to work together is no longer an option but is an
66. " 'The early months are so important,' observed David Gergen, a senior official in
four White Houses. 'Because that's when you have the most authority, but that's also
when you have the least capacity for making the right decisions.'" KUMAR, supra note 5,
at 2.
67. As the Supreme Court stated in another. context, "An incumbent President should
not be dependent on happenstance or the whim of a prior President when he seeks access
to records of past decisions that define or channel current governmental obligations."
Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,452 (1977).
68. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Law of PresidentialTransitions and the 2000 Election,
2001 BYU L. REV. 1573, 1632-37 (2001) (noting the dangers when transitions do not
proceed smoothly).
69. Cf THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES

416-19 (2004)

(discussing the need for better information-sharing within government to combat
terrorism).
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unavoidable demand of the contemporary world. The need for
presidential transitions to proceed in accord with the good
government model is therefore manifest.
But social and government complexity and national security and
foreign policy dangers are not all that has changed. National politics
as well have undergone transformation. We have entered, in the
words of one writer, the era of the permanent campaign in which all
government action is undertaken with an eye to its electoral effect."
Accordingly, presidential power is exercised not only in the service of
government but also in the service of the next legislative battle, the
next election, and even the next news cycle.71 For the outgoing
President or incoming President to choose not to work with the other
(particularly when they are from different political parties) might
then be seen as politically necessary. After all, neither side wants to
help political opponents further their political agenda. Moreover,
even if motivated by good government concerns, neither side wants to
risk that what the other will learn in the transition process will be
used to tarnish or damage their own political aims or reputation.
Good deeds in Washington seldom go unpunished. The "good
politics" motivation in presidential transition, in short, is also in
ascendance.
It might be tempting to suggest that during transition both
incoming and outgoing Presidents should adopt the good government
as opposed to the good politics mode of action. But there is no clear
line between the good government and good politics models. In the
era of the permanent campaign, the act of governing cannot be
separated from the act of campaigning. Indeed, most actors we
suspect would perceive themselves as pursuing both. If the outgoing
President believes, for example, that the announced goal of the
incoming administration to reform social security or health care is a
fool's enterprise that would cause long-term damage to the nation,
then he might legitimately believe that he should do all that is in his
power to frustrate that effort. In these circumstances, placing
obstacles before the new administration may be both good
government and good politics. The question is whether there are

70. See SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL, THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN 23-26 (Simon &
Schuster 1982) (1980) (explaining that with the decline of political parties, the permanent
campaign has become necessary to generate and sustain political support); see also Joe
Klein, The Perils of the Permanent Campaign, TIME, Nov. 7, 2005, at 44 (noting the
pressure of the permanent campaign in winning the focus of the daily news cycle).
71. See Klein, supra note 70, at 44, 47 (arguing that the Bush administration uses its
power for political purposes).
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constitutional obligations that should govern his judgment, and it is to
this issue we now turn.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL
TRANSITION

There are no cases addressing presidential duties and obligations
with respect to transition, and even if a legal dispute developed, it is
likely that a court would find it nonjusticiable.72 Moreover, it might
also be argued that any transition obligations are at best products of

comity and historical practice rather than true legal duties. After all,
presidential transitions have taken place from the beginning without
legal rules being articulated and with both incoming and outgoing
Presidents apparently assuming they could do as they wished.73

Finally, it might be contended that the President's discretion as to
how (and whether) to execute her powers with regard to transition is
so broad that no meaningful constraints can be discerned with respect
to how the President must act.
That said, the position that the Constitution imposes duties on
Presidents with respect to transitions is substantial and significant.
While our arguments are legal, it is important to note at the outset

that establishing that the outgoing President is constitutionally
obligated to provide transition assistance may serve as an effective
counterweight to the pressures of the permanent campaign and the
excessive partisanship that currently dominate presidential politics.
72. The transition period is so short that the issue might be moot by the time it is
ready for legal resolution. Courts, moreover, have been reluctant to review actions
committed to executive branch discretion. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831
(1985) (stating that an agency's decision whether or not to take enforcement action is
generally not reviewable). The fact that an issue may be nonjusticiable, of course, does
not mean that it does not give rise to a determinable constitutional question. It only
means that the courts are not the arbiters of the constitutional issue. As Dawn Johnsen
notes, "[t]he President's obligation faithfully to execute the laws is not contingent on the
availability of judicial review as a check on presidential excess. Indeed, the President
should act with particular care when a controversial assertion of authority may be nonjusticiable." Dawn E. Johnsen, The Constitution Under Clinton: A Critical Assessment:
Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 7, 26 (2000); see also Christopher N. May, PresidentialDefiance of
'Unconstitutional'Laws: Reviving the Royal Prerogative,21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865,
992-96 (1994) (arguing that when a President refuses to execute a law based on a claim of
unconstitutionality, she should do everything possible to ensure that the question is
subjected to judicial review).
73. Despite the lack of clear standards, the transition behavior of individual actors has
been seriously criticized. John Adams, for example, was seriously criticized both for his
last-minute judicial appointments and for leaving Washington, D.C. before his successor,
Thomas Jefferson, was inaugurated. See supra note 45.
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Second, and more importantly, the conclusion that the President has
duties and obligations with respect to transition is soundly based in
constitutional law. Indeed, support for this proposition may be found
in constitutional text, in the President's implied powers, and,
arguably, in general principles of representative government. We
shall discuss each of these arguments in turn.
A.

Constitutional Text
Four textual provisions arguably impose transition duties on the
outgoing President-the Term Clauses, the Take Care Clause, and
the Oath Clause. As will be discussed, the obligations imposed by the
Term Clauses and the Oath Clause, although critically important, are
relatively limited. The President's Take Care Clause responsibilities,
on the other hand, are potentially broader but less clearly defined.
1. The Term Clauses
The simplest argument that the Constitution imposes at least
some minimal obligations on a President with respect to transition
stems from the Term Clauses of Article I and the Twentieth
Amendment.74 The Term Clauses set the presidential term at four
years (unless the President is reelected) with the term ending at noon
on January 20 of the year following the November election. The
Term Clauses therefore demand that the President vacate the office
at the end of that period" and, as such, stand for the proposition that
not all of the President's behavior related to transition is fully
discretionary. He is bound by at least one concrete constraint.76
The obligation of the outgoing President to vacate the office and
relinquish all official powers at the end of the term may seem so
obvious that it is not worth stating, but history and current events are
full of examples of rulers who have illegitimately held on to power
after their terms were supposed to have ended. Moreover, even
though the history of peaceful transitions in the United States
74. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("He shall hold his Office during the Term of four
Years.
); U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1 ("The terms of the President and Vice
President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January ...").
75. The obligation to leave office could be seen as derived from Article II, Section 1
limiting the presidential term to four years; the Twentieth Amendment, which provides
that the term ends at noon on January 20; and/or the Take Care Clause, Article II, Section
3, which would impose upon the President the duty to assure that compliance with the
four-year term.
76. To be sure, not even this argument is fail-safe. It might be contended that the
duty to vacate the office arises after the President is no longer President and therefore
does not interfere with absolute presidential discretion.
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suggests that no President would likely attempt holdover only in
order to retain power, there are circumstances in which a President
might be tempted to hold on to power on an interim basis because of
a national crisis or other such event." Consider, for example, the
situation facing the outgoing President if the incoming President and
Vice President are killed prior to assuming office, or if the election
results are not finalized and remain in dispute after inauguration day.
In both circumstances, legitimate concerns of government stability
might lead an incumbent President (perhaps with both strong popular
and congressional support) to believe he should guide the country
through the period of uncertainty."8
Even so, we submit, the
President must leave office. The language of the clauses is absolute:
the term lasts four years and ends at noon on January 20, whether or
not a new President has been inaugurated.7 9 Moreover, not only is
the language of the clauses unconditional, but the policies underlying
77. Although it does not involve the President, there were reports that New York
Mayor Rudy Giuliani considered staying on as mayor after his term expired in the wake of
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer & Michael
Cooper, Giuliani Explores a Term Extension of 2 or 3 Months, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001,
at Al.
78. President Roosevelt, for example, relied on the concern for government stability
in a time of crisis when he decided to run for a third term. See REXFORD G. TUGWELL,
THE DEMOCRATIC ROOSEVELT:

A BIOGRAPHY OF FRANKLIN D.

ROOSEVELT 534

(1957). The question arises as to whether Franklin Roosevelt should be deemed to have
violated his duty to leave office when he stood for reelection a second time, contrary to
the longstanding tradition that the President should serve two terms only. On the one
hand, the tradition against seeking a third term had been established since Washington
and had become deeply rooted in the constitutional culture. Thus, it might be argued that
by ignoring this deeply-rooted tradition, Roosevelt violated his legal obligations. Cf.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992) (discussing the role of
"constitutional culture" in interpreting takings cases). On the other hand, pro-term limits
forces were never able to muster enough support to pass a constitutional amendment until
after Roosevelt's second re-election, thus indicating the "tradition" may not have evolved
into a set requirement. The better argument, then, is that even if Roosevelt acted in
contradiction to non-legal norms, he had no legal duty to refrain from running for a third
term.
79. The Constitution grants Congress the power to appoint the President in
circumstances where neither a President-elect nor Vice President-elect have qualified for
office. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3 ("Congress may by law provide for the case
wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring
who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected,
and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have
qualified."). Whether Congress could appoint an outgoing President to continue in office
in such circumstances is not immediately clear. While the Twentieth Amendment itself
does not explicitly exclude the outgoing President from congressional consideration, such
an appointment could still be deemed to be inconsistent with the text and the policies of
the Term Clause. In any event, the Twentieth Amendment clearly does not grant to the
President herself the authority to choose to remain in office even if the incoming President
and Vice President are not able to assume office.
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the provisions are equally uncompromising. Transition in time of
crisis and uncertainty may be risky, but the risk of abuse of power by
an incumbent government is, in the long run, even greater.
Second, the Term Clauses (in possible conjunction with the Take
Care Clause)8" demand that the President must do all that is possible
to assure that elections take place. As recent history suggests, one
could imagine a strong argument for postponing a national election in
a time of crisis. In fact, in 2004, there were published reports that the
Bush administration was considering its available options in case
terrorism threatened the viability or safety of the November
elections. In our view, unless it is physically impossible to conduct
the election, it would be inconsistent with the nation's traditions and
history, in which elections have been held during the gravest of crises,
for a President to continue in office beyond the constitutionally
mandated term.'
The incumbent President has a duty to do
everything possible to ensure that an election is conducted, and the
presidential term completed, according to its constitutionally and
statutorily mandated schedule.
At the same time, it is difficult to read the Term Clauses as
setting any more than such basic duties on the President. They imply
nothing, for example, about assuring that the President's successor is
adequately prepared to take office, and they provide no direction
about whether the President is free to pursue his own political agenda
during the transition period or whether he must be more solicitous of
his successor's agenda.
2. The Oath Clause
Another textual basis from which to infer transition duties
derives from the Oath Clause. The Oath Clause requires that before
entering office, a President will "solemnly swear (or affirm) that [she]
will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States,
80. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
81. See Michael Isikoff, Exclusive: Election Day Worries, NEWSWEEK, July 19, 2004,
at 8; see also Can Terrorists Postpone Election?, USA TODAY (Mag.), Sept. 1, 2004, at 9
(discussing whether presidential elections could be postponed in the event of a terrorist
attack).
82. President Lincoln, for example, insisted in the midst of the Civil War that the
election of 1864 go forward on schedule. "We cannot," he declared, "have free
government without elections; and if the rebellion could force us to forego, or postpone a
national election, it might fairly claim to have already conquered and ruined us." Jill
Elaine Hasday, Comment, Civil War as Paradigm: Reestablishing the Rule of Law at the
End of the Cold War, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 129, 134 (1996) (quoting Abraham
Lincoln, Response to a Serenade (Nov. 10, 1864), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 101 (Roy P. Basler et al. eds., 1953)).
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and will to the best of [her] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the
83
Constitution of the United States.
That the Oath Clause imposes important duties on the President
is not controversial.' As one commentator suggests, the duty of the
President to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the
United States may, in fact, be the President's "first duty."85 Indeed
the importance of the President's duty to "preserve, protect and
defend," has been seen as so central to his role that the language has
been interpreted as a source of presidential power as well as
obligation.86 Coined the President's "protective" power, the duty has
been interpreted as investing the President with broad and expansive
authority to take actions necessary to protect the property and
personnel of the United States from attack or other dangers. 87 In any
event, few would disagree that if the President did not act to protect
the nation from danger, he would be in violation of his Oath Clause
obligations.
It is also readily apparent that the President's protective duties
should also govern his actions with respect to transition. The
language itself that the President must "preserve" as well as protect
and defend the Constitution explicitly directs that the President take
actions with an eye to the future. His responsibilities are not limited
to his own term of office. Failure to alert and cooperate with the
incoming President with respect to imminent dangers facing the
nation directly exposes the country to substantial risk. The new
administration cannot be expected to sift though complex
information, much of it classified and much of it conflicting, regarding
potential dangers to the United States only upon taking office and
still be able to craft effective responses. Reliance on the advice and
direction of the previous administration is absolutely necessary to
protect the United States. An outgoing President's refusal to provide
that information and warn his successor as to potential dangers
contradicts his protective duties.
Accordingly, the outgoing
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
8.
84. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1257, 1258 (2004); Saikrishna Prakash, The Changing Law of War: Do We Need a

83.

New Legal Regime After September 11?: The Constitution as a Suicide Pact, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1299, 1314-15 (2004).
85. Paulsen, supra note 84, at 1263.
86. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 82 (1890) (Lamar, J., dissenting); see also Suspension of
the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 82 (1861) (stating that the
duty to "preserve, protect and defend" the Constitution "implies the power to perform
what he is required in so solemn a manner to undertake").
87. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 14-15 (1993).
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President's decisions whether or not to brief his successor on
domestic or international threats to national security are not optional.
"To preserve, protect and defend" means cooperating to the fullest
degree to protect the United States against impending danger.88
At the same time, the duties imposed by this provision, although
critically important to the national interest, are limited in substantive
scope. Refusal to allow the new administration access to government
briefings on most domestic matters, for example, while harming the
ability of the new President to make informed choices, would not
likely threaten the Republic's survival. The "preserve, protect and
defend" language, in short, imposes special duties in transition only
with respect to matters of national security, broadly understood as
those matters that threaten national survival.
A transition duty broader than one pursuant to the President's
protective obligations might be inferred by the oath's requirement
that the President "faithfully execute the Office of the President."
Consider the following hypothetical. Assume that the outgoing
President refuses to provide, and prohibits all members of his
administration from providing, any and all advice and assistance with
respect to transition.89 This means, for example, that he refuses to
allow the new President access to critical information on national
security and foreign policy matters, that he refuses to allow members
of his administration to brief incoming personnel on any issues
whatsoever, and that he does not allow representatives of the new
administration access to the White House in order to prepare for
even the most basic elements of transition-the allocation of office
space and the setup of a basic communications infrastructure.
Whether such action would violate the oath to faithfully execute the
office depends on whether "executing" an office includes preparing a
new occupant of that office for transition. Although the answer is
certainly debatable (executing an office may or may not necessarily
mean preparing that office for transition), we believe that the better
argument is that when the Oath Clause is read as a whole, it imposes
transition obligations. That the Oath Clause references a duty to the
office itself suggests that the incumbent's responsibilities extend
88. Given the timing, the generality of the duties involved, and their political nature,
no legal remedy may exist for transgressions of these duties. Potential reputational loss
and political consequences for the President's party provide some incentive to carry out
transition-related duties, even in the absence of a legal remedy.
89. We will assume, however, in order to avoid any statutory non-enforcement issues,
that the President does not prohibit the General Services Administration from funding the
incoming transition team or from preparing the necessary material under the Presidential
Transition Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-293, 114 Stat. 1035 (2000).
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beyond his own tenure, and the most obvious direction for that
responsibility to be exercised is towards the next President.
We do not contend, however, that the outgoing President's
transition duties under the Oath Clause go beyond those found in the
Take Care Clause, which are addressed below. There is nothing in
the language of the Oath Clause that suggests that the outgoing
President must abandon his own agenda at the end of his term or that
he must facilitate the new agenda of his successor, but he should not
act in a way that disables or obstructs the new President, even for a
brief period at the beginning of the term, from "tak[ing] Care that the
Laws [are] faithfully executed."90
3. The Take Care Clause
The Take Care Clause, Article II, Section 3, provides that the
President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."'"
The language is notable. In contrast to Article I, Section 8, which
provides that Congress "shall have Power" to engage in certain
actions,' the Take Care Clause explicitly imposes a duty on the

90. Although this Article is primarily concerned with the transition duties of outgoing
administrations, the question might also be raised as to whether the Take Care and Oath
Clauses should be read to impose duties on the President-elect even before she assumes
office. Franklin Roosevelt, for example, was seriously criticized in this respect for refusing
to assist President Hoover during the transition period with respect to the bank solvency
crisis that had enveloped the nation. During the transition, as depression-era bank failures
accelerated, the governor of Michigan declared a "bank holiday" during which the banks
were closed. This led to widespread panic and more bank failures as depositors rushed to
withdraw their money. President Hoover, as a lame duck, did not feel he had the political
power to take decisive action without agreement from the President-elect and repeatedly
attempted to convince Roosevelt to agree to action such as declaring a national banking
holiday. Roosevelt, however, refused to take action and the situation continued to
deteriorate. See HENRY, supra note 1, at 343-55. Arguably, Roosevelt's decision not to
assist Hoover harmed the nation's long-term interests. Even so, however, we suggest that
he or any other President-elect does not have any obligation to take action during
transition. Certainly, the text does not support imposing obligations. After all, before
inauguration the President-elect has no power to execute the laws and she has not yet
taken the oath of office. There are pragmatic concerns, as well, that militate against
imposing constitutional obligations. First, imposing a duty to act on the part of an
incoming administration might actively harm the functions of government by leading to
duplicative or potentially inconsistent action by the incoming President in relation to the
incumbent administration. Second, even if the incumbent were willing to step aside, the
incoming administration may not have the preparation, knowledge, or ability to take all
necessary steps to resolve a serious problem. Thus, while action on the part of an
incoming administration may be desirable, especially if taken in cooperation with the
incumbent, we do not find a constitutional duty to act until the President actually takes
office.
91. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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President. The Congress that chooses not to legislate does not violate

its constitutional obligations; Congress may choose to exercise power
or not, as it sees fit. The Take Care Clause, on the other hand,
provides the President with no such option; she shall take care that
the laws are faithfully executed.

Not surprisingly then, the Take Care Clause has been construed
as imposing affirmative obligations on the President. These include
requiring her to expend appropriated funds,9 3 enforce statutes,94 and

implement Supreme Court decisions.95 To be sure, not all of this is
uncontroversial and none of it is absolute. The extent that the Take
Care Clause imposes enforceable duties on the President, for
example, has been hotly debated.96
And there is substantial
agreement that whatever the obligations the Take Care Clause

imposes, the
President has significant discretion as to how to carry
97
them out.

The

question

is how

does

this understanding

apply

to

presidential transitions? In some instances, the application of the
Take Care provision may be clear. A President, for example, who
refuses to take any action to assure that necessary pre-transition
activities such as elections occur according to constitutional mandate
may violate his Take Care obligations.9" He may also violate his Take
Care obligations if he refuses to allow appropriated funds to go to the
incoming administration's transition team as provided by statute. 99
But whether this responsibility goes beyond enforcing any
specific constitutional provisions1 °° presents a more difficult question.
93. Train v. New York, 420 U.S. 35, 41 (1975); Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838).
94. Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 613.
95. See The Attorney General's Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally
Objectionable Legislation, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 55 (1980); Arthur S. Miller, The
President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 389, 400, 402 (1987)
(contending that the President's Take Care powers include the obligation to enforce
Supreme Court decisions).
96. The literature on presidential refusal to enforce statutes that are potentially
constitutionally objectionable is particularly rich. See Miller, supra note 95, at 395-99;
Peter L. Strauss, The Presidentand Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
107, 108 (2000). See generally Johnsen, supra note 72 (considering the legitimacy of
"presidential nonenforcement").
97. Cf Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 62 (1994) (characterizing the Take Care clause as one of "a laundry list
of other discretionary presidential duties").
98. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
99. Cf. Zywicki, supra note 68, at 1575 (describing the General Services
Administration's refusal to authorize transition assistance in 2000, until the election
controversy was resolved).
100. It is not controversial that the mandate of the Take Care Clause that the President
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In order to address this point, consider again the hypothetical of a
President ordering his administration not to work with
representatives of the incoming presidency. Undoubtedly, if the
President were to take such an action it could seriously impair the
ability of the new administration to begin its term effectively. It
might also threaten the foreign policy and national security interests
of the United States.
The argument that the outgoing President's refusal to assist
transition violates the President's duties under the Take Care Clause
is relatively straightforward. If the President has not provided his
successor with the means to execute the laws, he has not taken care
that the laws will be faithfully executed.
Nevertheless, the contention that failing to assist one's successor
violates the Take Care Clause must meet a number of initial
objections. The first is temporal. How can a President be held
responsible for failing to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed during a time period when he is no longer in office?
The second is more structural. Unlike the cases that address
failure to spend appropriated funds or enforce specific laws, the
failure to assist in transition does not raise separation of powers
concerns. The claim that the President is acting unconstitutionally
when she refuses to spend funds, for example, is buttressed in large
part by the argument that her proper recourse is to veto the bill
authorizing the expenditure. 1 1 Refusing to spend funds is therefore
an end-run around the veto requirement. No such problem arises
when the President simply refuses to assist with transition. She is not,
by that action, undercutting the authority of another branch of
government. Instead she is merely refusing to act within the bounds
of her constitutional authority.
The third is historical. The argument that the President does not
violate the Constitution when he refuses to take a set of actions may
also be supported by constitutional history. The framers explicitly
considered and rejected a provision that would make the President
impeachable for maladministration.012 This history might be read as
supporting the proposition that maladministration alone, of which
failure to assist with transition is surely a part, does not rise to the
execute the laws also means that he must appropriately execute the Constitution. The
term "laws" in the Take Care Clause "necessarily includes the Constitution." Strauss,
supra note 96, at 108.
101. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 732 (3d ed. 1999).
102. Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation,81 IOWA L. REv. 1267, 1309 (1996).
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level of unconstitutionality.
None of these arguments, however, are persuasive. First, the
answer to the temporal argument that the outgoing President has no
obligation to assure that the laws are faithfully executed during the
next President's term may be found in the nature of the Take Care
Clause itself. The language of the clause is supervisory. The clause
does not demand that the President enforce the laws herself.13
Rather it requires that she take measures to assure that the laws are
effectively enforced1 °n A new administration that assumes office
without the benefits of briefing or other critical transition assistance
will, at least for some period, be unable to perform its enforcement
duties appropriately because it will lack the requisite knowledge to
make informed choices. The outgoing President, who, by refusing
transition assistance, causes the new administration's disability,
therefore has not taken care that the laws will be faithfully executed.
Likewise, the second, structural argument is incomplete. The
constitutionality of presidential action need not be determined by
whether it intrudes on another branch's prerogatives. A President
who takes office without taking the oath of office, for example, has
explicitly violated a constitutional command even if her action does
not threaten separation of powers. 05 Similarly, a President who fails
to appoint any Executive Branch officers has also violated her
constitutional duties, °6 even though such inaction does not undercut
the powers of the other two branches.
Finally, the historical maladministration argument is also not
persuasive.
Deliberately failing to facilitate transition can be
considered as more than maladministration but rather as a willful
abdication of duty. As such, it would violate enacted constitutional
provisions such as the Take Care Clause and not merely
constitutional proposals that would have proscribed unintentional
incompetency.
The Take Care Clause, then; fairly read, imposes the obligation
on the outgoing President to assist in preparing his successor for
office.
As we see it, an outgoing President who orders his
administration to abstain from helping the incoming President would
be acting unconstitutionally.
We do not read the Take Care Clause, however, as requiring the

103.
104.
105.
106.

See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 97, at 61-62.
See Strauss, supra note 96, at 108.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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outgoing President to facilitate the ability of the incoming President
to effectuate changes in current policy. This conclusion also derives
from constitutional text. The constitutional provision speaks only of
the responsibility to faithfully execute the laws-not to work to
change the laws that already exist. We therefore believe that the
better reading of the Take Care Clause is that it requires the outgoing
President to prepare the new President to be able to immediately
execute the law upon taking office, but it does not require the
outgoing President to do anything to facilitate the new President's
tenure beyond that obligation.
Similarly, we do not read the Take Care Clause as requiring an
outgoing President, even a defeated incumbent, to abandon his own
agenda during the transition period. This would mean, for example,
that an outgoing President is free to issue regulations or executive
orders late in the term even if he knows they will be undone by the
incoming President, and even if his purpose in so doing may be to
cause the incoming President to expend political capital to reverse the
actions."°7 The Take Care Clause does not impose upon the outgoing
President the duty to assist the incoming President in taking a firm
political hold of the presidency.
B.

ForeignAffairs
The President's implied and express powers to conduct foreign
affairs"8 also give rise to presidential obligations during transition.
The implied foreign affairs powers of the President necessarily flow
from the explicit powers to receive ambassadors and negotiate
107. Undoing the work of a lame-duck President is a long-standing tradition for
incoming Presidents. For example, President Grover Cleveland had made forest
protection one of the key aims of his administration; however, the issue was so
controversial that Cleveland waited until February of 1897, when he was a lame duck, to
"set aside twenty-one million acres of timber land as forest reserves to preserve it from
logging." Combs, supra note 29, at 332. Encouraged by "incensed constituents," members
of the House of Representatives tried to impeach Cleveland for two days,
and when that effort failed, the Senate attached to the Sundry Civil Bill a rider
annulling Cleveland's reservations. Cleveland issued a pocket veto and left office.
Incoming President McKinley then convened a Special Session of Congress to
address the reservations, and it enacted the Organic Administration Act of 1897,
which suspended the reservations and limited the purposes for which national
forests could be reserved.
Id.
108. The Constitution explicitly gives the President the power to make treaties as well
as appoint and receive ambassadors. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3. Other foreign affairs
powers, such as the ability to recognize governments or enter into executive agreements,
are not explicit in the text.
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treaties. These powers include all manner of foreign relations such as
recognizing foreign governments and proclaiming the neutrality of
the United States when other nations are at war. 10 9 Dealings with
foreign nations are not possible without a single authoritative voice.
These powers have expanded dramatically in recent decades, 1 ° and
the President's responsibilities stemming from this power cannot be
overstated."'
As one court proclaimed, "[t]he President is the
constitutional representative of the United States with respect to
2
external affairs.""1
The primacy of the presidency in foreign affairs raises special
concerns in the conduct of presidential transitions. Once an election
occurs, other nations begin to look to the President-elect rather than
the incumbent President for leadership, which makes it difficult for
the United States to conduct foreign policy during the period between
the election and inauguration day."' Thus, as Nancy Combs reports,
"lame-duck Presidents usually steer clear of significant or
controversial international issues; or, at the least, they seek their
successors' concurrence or commitment as to the course to pursue.""' 4
Midnight presidential action in foreign relations can be much
more damaging to the interests of the United States and the
principles of presidential succession than late-term conduct in the
domestic sphere. As a general matter, the ability of the United States
to engage in foreign relations depends to a great extent on its
reliability as an international partner.'1 5 Abrupt changes in foreign
policy can do great damage to the country's ability to advance its
interests internationally.
Because of this, once an outgoing
administration makes a commitment, it may be very difficult for the

109. See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over
Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231,312, 328 (2001).
110. The expansion in presidential power in foreign affairs has not gone unchallenged.
Numerous commentators have pointed out the dangers of vesting so much concentrated
power in one person. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105
YALE L.J. 1725, 1727 (1996) (arguing that the executive branch has never been more
powerful than it is presently). For the view that the President's foreign affairs powers
have always been expansive, see H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over
Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 554-55
(1999).
111. See Powell, supra note 110, at 555 (discussing the primacy of presidential power in
foreign affairs).
112. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d. 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), vacated, 444 U.S.
996 (1979).
113. Combs, supra note 29, at 305.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 334.
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incoming administration to reverse course." 6 Further, it would place

an incoming administration in a very awkward position if it had to
work with, and perhaps around, its predecessor's late-term foreign
policy initiatives with which it disagreed and perhaps even
campaigned against.
In our view, these special factors in the foreign relations context
give rise to a duty on the part of an outgoing administration to refrain
from engaging in avoidable significant foreign policy initiatives during
the transition period and perhaps during the lead up to the election.

7

During the transition, significant foreign policy steps should be left to
the new administration, and the outgoing administration should not
make any commitments or take any actions that would prejudice the
ability of the incoming administration to engage in foreign policy in
accordance with its electoral mandate. When there are pressing
issues, the incumbent administration should, as has been done in the
past,1 8 consult with its successors on the proper course of action. Not
only does

such

consultation

enhance

the legitimacy

of

the

administration's action, it strengthens the ability of the United States
to conduct foreign relations during this period because foreign
nations are already looking to the incoming administration.
At the same time, the incoming administration also has a duty

not to abruptly abandon the foreign policy positions of its
116. An incoming administration inclined to repudiate late-term commitments made
by its predecessor may find that international law places an additional obstacle in the way
of its foreign policy goals. As Nancy Combs explains:
A certain tension exists between democracy and international law regardless of
whether the administration binding the state is a lame duck. Democracy requires
deference to the right of the majority to change its mind, whereas international
law, in its effort to attain the stability necessary to ensure the peace and security of
states, requires states to honor their commitments until the other party or parties
to the agreement consents to a change.
Id. While we view the issue more in terms of presidential succession than purely
democracy, the problem is the same-international law may stand in the way of policy
changes that would normally occur in light of the outcome of the presidential election.
117. These factors also require the outgoing President to assure that the new
administration is fully briefed on foreign affairs matters. As with the national security
matters discussed above, the incoming administration will need to have as full an
understanding as possible prior to assuming office in order to be able to act appropriately
in this area. Moreover, the fact that much of the information relevant to foreign affairs
decisionmaking will not be public creates a greater necessity that the outgoing
administration take steps to assure that the new administration is fully informed on the
day it takes office.
118. See HENRY, supra note 1, at 445-48, 483-87 (remarking on President Hoover's
advance consultations with Franklin Roosevelt and discussing pre-inauguration talks
between Presidents Truman and Eisenhower).
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predecessor. The need for continuity in policy goes in both
directions: the successor administration also needs to be solicitous of
previous administration's policies in order to promote the nation's
larger foreign policy objectives.
None of this means that it is impossible for the United States to
change courses in foreign policy. A new President, a President facing
changed circumstances, or even a President whose views have
changed, violates no constitutional duty or normative principle if he
changes directions in foreign policy. In fact, the main reason that
outgoing Presidents should not take significant foreign policy actions
is to allow the new President to forge her own direction in foreign
relations. However, the President's constitutional duties demand that
the President, at all times, be sensitive to the damage that can be
done by changing foreign policy made in a manner that makes the
United States appear to be an unreliable partner in foreign relations.
In sum, because of the concerns regarding presidential transition
and foreign affairs, different transition obligations arise than is the
case with domestic matters. Foreign policy requires continuity and
reliability to be effective. Unlike most domestic issues, the President
cannot suddenly and dramatically change course in foreign affairs
without harming the nation's international standing. Thus, in order to
promote an effective foreign policy, a President must work within the
framework established by his predecessor and create a framework
that allows his successor to be effective. In the foreign policy area,
the incoming and outgoing Presidents cannot ignore the other's
political agendas. Both have an affirmative duty to work with each
other's policies.
C. Democratic Theory

The final arguable constraint on the outgoing President's actions
during transition concerns his obligations under democratic theory to
respond to the popular will."' As mentioned in the introduction,
119. That nontextual principles such as democratic theory may legitimately form a
basis of constitutional interpretation, while theoretically debatable, has nevertheless
become an established tradition in constitutional law. For example, notions of federalism
have long guided constitutional interpretation although federalism is nowhere mentioned
in the Constitution. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) (explaining the
nontextual principle of "Our Federalism" as prohibiting federal courts from interfering
with ongoing state prosecutions). Indeed, claims that the Constitution should be
interpreted by resort to extratextual principle have come from a variety of sources and
from a variety of angles. Recently, Justice Breyer, for example, has argued that promoting
the democratic process should guide constitutional interpretation. See Stephen Breyer,
Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 245-47 (2002). Michael Paulsen,
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presidential transitions are awkward times in our democracy. Power
remains in the hands of an individual who is at least four years
removed from his most recent electoral success and, in the case of a
defeated incumbent, has actually been repudiated in the most recent
election. Meanwhile, the person who has just earned an electoral
mandate is on the sidelines without the power to start the agenda that
she was elected to pursue.

In these circumstances, the outgoing lame-duck President who
acts in disregard of the electoral results by either taking measures to
inhibit the new President's ability to fulfill her electoral duties or
continuing to advance an agenda that has been defeated at the polls
can be seen as acting contrary to the popular will and therefore in
violation of democratic principles. 2 ' Indeed, the fact that a lameduck Congress continued to pursue a course of action that had been
rejected at the polls was the major precipitating event behind the
passage of the Twentieth Amendment.12 1
The most serious weakness in contending that legal obligations

of transition can be generated from democratic theory is that it may
prove too much. Taken at its most extreme, it would require that the
lame-duck administration actually start the new administration's
agenda or, at least, that it cease to take any action that could be seen
as contrary to the new administration's policies. But placing the
outgoing President in what is in effect a secondary position with
respect to the incoming President creates its own set of problems. As
meanwhile, has claimed that presidential power should be judged in relation to a principle
of constitutional necessity. See Paulsen, supranote 84, at 1263.
120. Proponents of the Twentieth Amendment, which moved up the inauguration of
the President and the installation of the new Congress, made this argument to champion
their cause. See, e.g., 75 CONG. REC. 3864 (1932) (statement of Rep. Stafford) ("The voice
of the people in the election of their representatives is the supreme law of the land."); 74
CONG. REC. 5880 (1931) (statement of Rep. Glover) ("We are a Nation that says the
people ought to rule.
); id. at 5898 (statement of Rep. McCormack) ("In a
representative government it is essential that the will of the voters immediately go into
effect and operation.").
121. The impetus for the Twentieth Amendment may be directly traced
to President Warren Harding's support for ship subsidies in 1922 .... The issue of
ship subsidies had been central to the 1922 congressional campaigns, and the
voters had defeated most members of Congress who supported the subsidy
legislation. President Harding, still desirous of enacting the legislation, called a
special lame-duck session of Congress to consider the matter. This action so
inflamed certain Senators that they drafted what later became the Twentieth
Amendment to the Constitution.
Combs, supra note 29, at 332; see also John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment
Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 470, 479-84 (1997) (describing reasons why lame-duck
Congresses were targeted in the Twentieth Amendment).
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a theoretical matter, it subordinates the existing President to little
more than an agent of his successor. Second, it creates the practical
problems of forcing persons potentially opposed to a particular
agenda to begin the process of effectuating its implementation. That
is not a map for success.
Moreover, the democratic theory argument actually cuts both
ways. The outgoing President was elected to a four-year term ending
on January 20. His term does not end at the moment election results
are finalized. He enjoys an electoral mandate for the full four-year
period. Moreover, the Twentieth Amendment, although apparently
intended to prohibit lame-duck legislation by Congress,' 122 does not so
clearly govern lame-duck activity by the outgoing President. After
all, the amendment provides that congressional terms shall begin on
January 3 while inauguration day for the President is set for January
20.123 The possibility that a lame-duck President will be acting with a
newly elected legislature is therefore inevitable. We therefore reject
the argument that the democratic theory principle (outside the realm
of foreign policy as discussed above) 124 formally constrains the action
of the outgoing President. 125
III. TRANSITION AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Transition at the federal agencies has a different dynamic than at
the White House. To begin with, it is less abrupt. At the White
House there is virtually a complete change of personnel from one
administration to the next, particularly when there is a change in
political party. In the final moments of a presidential term, the White
House empties and in the moments after inauguration a whole new
team moves in. No instructions are left behind as to how to run the
most powerful governmental engine in the world.
At the agencies, in contrast, most employees are career civil
servants and relatively few of the positions turn over to presidential
appointees.2 6 The incoming appointees at the agencies are therefore
122. See Nagle, supra note 121, at 486.
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
124. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
125. This is not to say that the policies of good government do not counsel the outgoing
President in favor of deferring to the popular will as expressed by the election of his
successor. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68. Our point is only that he is under no
constitutional obligation to do so.
126. The Plum book lists 9,051 non-career positions in the federal government out of a
total federal workforce in 2003 of more than 1.8 million employees excluding the Postal
Service. See PLUM BOOK, supra note 41, at 215; United States Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs041.htm.
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not faced with the lack of continuity that occurs at the White House.
Instead, at the agencies, the President's appointees preside over
career officials with experience and expertise who provide stability
and continuity as well as on-the-job training. While this may make it
more difficult for the incoming President to immediately advance her
own policy agenda, it makes it less likely that the transition will result
in the inability of the President to execute the laws.
The
administrative machinery continues to operate to enforce and execute
the laws even if the new administration is not yet prepared to place its
political stamp on the agency agenda.
A major presidential transition issue that specifically implicates
the agencies, however, is the problem of midnight regulation. 127 As
noted previously, outgoing Presidents have created significant
difficulties for their successors by engaging in a high volume of action
at the end of terms."2 Such late-term action can create significant
problems for the incoming administration in two respects. First, the
sheer volume of late-term action may be a significant impediment to
effective administration early in the new President's term.129
Reviewing and assessing last minute rules will require the new
administration to spend significant resources addressing the work left
by the old administration rather than applying those same resources
to learn and master the business of government. Thus, it could be
argued that if midnight regulation significantly undercuts the ability
of the incoming President to adequately discharge her other
responsibilities, it violates the outgoing President's duties under the
Take Care and Oath Clauses.
Second, midnight regulation can impose substantial political
costs on the incoming President. When faced with new rules to which
it objects, the new administration will have the choice of either
enforcing these rules (or allowing those rules to become finalized if
the administrative process is unfinished) to the chagrin of its political
supporters or taking action to review, repeal or amend those rules.
Either option will tend to diminish the administration's ability to set
its own agenda during the crucial period at the beginning of the term.
Deliberately creating such political distractions for his successor,
then, arguably, can also be seen as violating the outgoing President's
transition duties.
127. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
129. See Beermann, supra note 62, at 963-64 (discussing administrative action at the
end of President Clinton's term); Cochran, supra note 59, at 3 (discussing volume of
administrative action at the end of the terms of several recent Presidents).
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Finally, even beyond its effects on the incoming administration,
excessive midnight regulation may be undesirable from a broader
societal perspective. 13 0 As Nina Mendelson argues, late-term agency
actions that are inconsistent with the incoming administration's
preferences could contribute to the public's cynicism about
government. She argues that the public may view such actions as
taken for the benefit of the officials involved rather than in the public
interest, and may appear to be "nose-thumbing by the outgoing
'
administration at the public's choice of a new President."1 31
Such
cynicism, Mendelson contends, could be seen as a threat to voter
participation in presidential elections. a32
Despite these concerns, however, we conclude that midnight
regulation does not violate an outgoing administration's transitionrelated constitutional duties. To begin with, the line between
permissible late-term action and undesirable "midnight regulation" is
unlikely to be particularly clear and is largely in the eye of the
beholder. As noted previously, some late-term regulation occurs
because of the tendency to work to deadline133 and determining the
outgoing administration's motivations with respect to any particular
regulation is likely to prove extraordinarily difficult."3
But consider even the clear case. Assume, for example, that
during a presidential campaign, the incumbent announces that he is
considering promulgating rules regarding federal expenditures for
stem cell research. The President's opponent meanwhile announces
her opposition to those rules and the issue becomes a major focus of
the presidential campaign with the end result that the incumbent is
defeated. The incumbent President then orders that rulemaking
proceed nevertheless knowing full well that the promulgation of those
rules will create serious political problems for his successor in her first
weeks in office.
Even in these circumstances, we suggest that the outgoing
President has not violated his transition obligations.
First, as
discussed previously, the outgoing President does not have a duty to
accommodate the political agenda of his successor and should be free

130. Mendelson, supra note 59, at 565.
131. Id.
132. Cf McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 206 n.88 (2003) (justifying
campaign finance regulation, in part, on the state's interest in preserving the "individual
citizen's confidence in government").
133. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-38 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing the difficulties in determining government motivation).
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to pursue his own agenda to the end of the term.135 The fact that the
outgoing President may, through the vehicle of late-term regulation,
choose to impose political costs on his successor is not constitutionally

problematic.
Second, in any event, the incoming President has legal tools to
protect herself against their predecessors' last minute actions-

including voluminous or politically undesirable late-term regulation.
For example, President George W. Bush, immediately upon taking
office, instructed his administration: 1) not to issue any new rules
(initiated during President Clinton's administration) until they could

be evaluated by a Bush appointee, 2) to pull back any rules that were
on the brink of being issued, and 3) to suspend the implementation of
any rules that had been promulgated but had not yet gone into
effect.136 Although there are arguments to the contrary,137 in our view

these actions were well within the legal rights of the new President.
Once a rule has gone into effect, current law makes it more difficult
to revise or rescind the rule. However, if a rule has not gone into
effect or created any reliance interests, a new administration should

be allowed to make whatever revisions, including rescission, that
would be supported by the original rulemaking record.138

Third, unlike other possible efforts to constrain the outgoing
President during transition, Congress has the power to regulate
against midnight regulation should it become too great a problem.

Congress seems powerless to prevent the President's failure to fulfill
the duties that arise under the Term, Oath, and Take Care Clauses
135. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
136. See Memorandum for Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001).
137. The basic attack on presidential intervention into the rulemaking process is that
once an agency has decided in favor of a rule, it is improper for an agency to pull or
suspend a rule based on an instruction from the President unrelated to the merits of the
rule. In our view, as long as the rulemaking record supports whatever action is ultimately
taken, the President's involvement should not be a cause for legal concern. For a more
detailed discussion of this issue, see Beermann, supra note 62, at 1007-15.
138. See id. Under current law, a rule already in effect is the baseline, and the
reasonableness of any change or rescission of a rule requires good reasons for the change.
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
It is not enough that the record underlying the original rule would have supported a
different rule or no rule at all and that the new administration takes a different view of the
policies underlying the rulemaking. We think there are good arguments that this makes it
too difficult for a new administration to make regulatory changes. In short, if the original
rulemaking record would have supported a different result, we do not believe that it
should be so difficult for a new administration to choose the different result, especially if
the change occurs before the original rule was scheduled to go into effect. See Beermann,
supra note 62, at 1010-11.
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discussed above. Even if, for example, a statute requiring the
President to meet with and brief the President-elect were
constitutional (which we doubt),13 9 we cannot imagine how Congress
could force the President to do anything of substance. It would be
difficult, if not impossible, to force the outgoing President to provide
genuine help in the transition. Because Congress has the power to
withdraw delegations in whole or in part, statutes embodying reforms
to late-term administrative action present no separation of powers
problem."4 Congress, as the master of delegations of legal authority
to the Executive Branch, could place temporal limits on rulemaking,
for example, by prohibiting the promulgation of new rules during the
period after the November election or by prohibiting the issuance of
any rules with an effective date after the election or inauguration of
the new President.
In sum, although midnight regulation may at times be unseemly
and even undesirable, the outgoing President has the right to
continue to pursue her agenda until the new President is inaugurated.
Because the incoming President has adequate tools to deal with any
last minute actions by the outgoing administration, we do not believe
that midnight regulation violates the outgoing President's transition
related duties.
CONCLUSION

The case that presidential transitions impose constitutional
obligations upon the President is substantial. Textual foundation for
this position exists in the Term, Take Care, and Oath Clauses.
Further support for this conclusion derives from the President's broad
The "rules" governing
foreign affairs and protective powers.
presidential transitions are more than simple matters of comity
without legal force, and while the legal principles at stake may be
quite general, they are substantial.
From the Term Clauses, it may be established that the outgoing
President should not act in any manner that threatens peaceful
presidential transition and must affirmatively take all possible steps to
139. But see Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 452 (1977) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act requiring
that the President preserve certain documents and records from his administration against
challenge that the Act infringed on presidential power).
140. See Biodiversity Assoc. v. Cables, 357 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004) ("[W]hen
Congress is exercising its own powers with respect to matters of public right, the executive
role of 'tak[ing] Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, is
entirely derivative of the laws passed by Congress, and Congress may be as specific in its
instructions to the Executive as it wishes.").
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assure that an orderly transition takes place. The Take Care Clause
requires that the outgoing President provide sufficient assistance to
the new administration so that the latter is able and prepared to
execute its powers from the first day in office. The Oath Clause and
the President's protective powers require the outgoing President to
do all that she can to alert the new President to any threats to the
nation's security and work with the new administration to the fullest
extent possible to prevent any harm to the nation. Finally, the
President's foreign affairs powers demand that both the outgoing and
incoming Presidents act in foreign policy matters in a manner that
advances the ability of the United States to effectively conduct
foreign affairs. This means that the outgoing President must be aware
and solicitous of the likely directions that the new President may take
on foreign affairs issues and not work in a manner that may
undermine the ability of the new President to achieve those goals. It
also means that the incoming President does not have a free hand to
reject the policies of his predecessor.
At the same time, the outgoing President is under no
constitutional obligation beyond those just described to implement
the new President's political agenda or to cease implementing her
own. This is so, moreover, even if the new President may be forced
by the outgoing President's actions to expend political capital to undo
the previous administration's work. The Constitution may impose
some basic requirements to assure a safe and peaceful democratic
transition, but it does not demand that the outgoing President pave
the political road for his successor.

